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SITUATION

II

SUBMARINES

Assurnirig that the treaty of the Conferen9e on Limitation of Arman1,ent, 1921-22, relating to the use of subInarines and noxious gases in \Varfare should not be rati,
fied, \Vhat are the privileges of a belligerent submarine~
CONCLUSION

A belligerent sub1narine la \Vfully co1nmissioned a~ a
vessel of \Var may exercise the rights of a vessel of \Var ~
but its nature gives it no special rights or privileges.
NOTES

Treaty in relation to the use of submarines and noxious
gases in W arfare. 2·-It is assumed in this situation that the
treaty in relatio.n to the use of submarines and noxious
gases of the ashington Conference on the Limitation of
Armament has :hot been ratified.
By Article II of the_ above treaty 'tall other civilized
powers " are invited " to express their assent" to Article I,
\Vhich is declared to be "among the rules adopted by
civilized nations." This reaffirmation is apparently to
make clearer to "the public opinion of the world the
€Stablished law." 1'he la\v as stated in Article I would
presumably be binding, even \vithout a treaty, because it
is declared to be " an established part of international
1

"T

la\v."
"2

A

TREATY PROPOSED AT .WASHINGTON, 1922, IN RELATION TO THE USE OF
SUBMARINES AND NOXIOUS GASES IN WARFARE

The United States of America, the British Empire, France, Italy and
Japan, hereinafter referred to as the Signa tory Powers, desiring to make
more effective the rules adopted by civilized nations1 for the protection of
the l:ves of neutrals and noncombatants at sea in time of war, and to pre-
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Queries a'S· to articles .-Many queries have arisen as to
the exact meaning of words and clauses in Article I of
the treaty. These questions vary in significance, but deserve attention because any new statement, even of la'v
already " adopted," should be clear to those who may be
bound to act in accordance with its provisions. It has
been asked whether the use of the word " adopted " in
the preamble and in Article I had the same meaning, and
vent the use in war of noxious gases and chemicals, have determined to
conclude a Treaty to this effect, and have appointed as their Plenipotentiaries:
[Names of plenipotentiaries.]
ARTICLE I

The Signatory Powers declare that among the rules adopted by civilized
nations for the protection of the lives of neutrals and noncombatants at
sea in time of war, the following are to be deemed ., an established part of
international law;
(1) A merchant vesJel must be ordered to submit to visit and search to
determine its character before it can be seized.
A merchant vessel must not be attacked unless it refuse to submit
to visit and search after warning, or to proceed as directed after seizure.
A merchant vessel must not be destroyed unless the crew and passengers
have been first placed in safety.
(2) Belligerent submarines are not under any circumstances exempt
from the universal rules above stated ; and if a submarine can not capture
a merchant vessel in conformity with these rules the existing law of
nations requires it to desist from attack and from seizure and to permit
the merchant vessel to proceed unmolested.
AUTICLE II

The Signatory Powers invite all other civilized Powers to express their
assent to the foregoing statement of established law so that there may be
a clear public understanding throughout the world of the standards of conduct by which the public opinion of the world is to pass judgment upon
future belligerents.
ARTICLE III

The Signatory Powers, desiring to insure the enforcement of the humane
rules of existing law declared by them with re-spect to attacks upon and the
seizure and destruction of merchant ships, further declare that any person
in the service of any Power who !}hall violate any of those rules, whether
or not such person is under orders of a governmental superior, sh~ll be
deemed to have violated the laws of war and shall be liable to trial and
punishment as if for an act of piracy and may be brought to trial before
the civil or military authorities of any Power within the jurisdiction of
which he may be found.
ARTICLE IV

The Signatory Powers recognize the practical impossibility of using submarines as commerce destroyers without violating, as they were violated

,
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it was presumed that the word referred to an act completed, or, as stated, rules " deemed an established part
of international law."
The first paragraph speaks of the rules enumerated
thereunder as "adopted by civilized nations for the protection of the lives of neutrals and noncombatants at sea
in time of 'var ." I'he history of the law of visit and
search shows .that it was primarily concerned with matin the recent war of 1914-1918, the requirements universally accepted by
civilized nations for the protection of the lives of neutrals and noncombatants, and to the end that the prohibition of the use of submarines as
commerce destroyers shall be universally accepted as a part of the law of
nations they now accept that prohibition as henceforth binding as between
themselves and they invite all other nations to adhere thereto.
ARTICLE V

The use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and all analogous liquids, materials or devices, having been justly condemned by the
general opinion of the civilized world and a prohibition of f:uch use having
been declared in treaties to which a majority of the civilized Powers are
pHrties,
The Signatory Powers, to the end that this prohibition shall be universally accepted as a part of international law binding alike the conscience
and practice of nations, declare their assent to such prohibition, agree to
be bound thereby as between themselves and invite all other civilized
nations to adhere thereto.
ARTICLE VI

/

The present Treaty shall be ratified as soon as possible in accordance
with the constitutional methods of the Signatory Powers and shall take
effect on the deposit of all the ratifications, _which shall take place at
Washington.
The Government of the United Sta tes will transmit to all the Signatory
Powers a certified copy of the proces-verbal of the deposit of ratifications.
The present Treaty, of which the French and English texts are both
authentic, shall remain deposited in the Archives of the Government of the
United States, and duly certified copies thereof will be transmitted by that
Government to each of the Signa tory Power;';.
ARTICLE VII

The Government of the United States will further transmit to each of
the Non-Signatory ·Powers a duly certified copy of the present Treaty and
invite its adherence thereto.
Any Non-Signatory Power may ·a dhere to the present Treaty by communicating an Instrument of Adherence to the Government of the United
States, which will thereupon transmit to each of the Signatory and Adhering Powe1·s a certified. copy of each Instrument of Adherence ..
In faith whereof, the above named Plenipotentiaries have signe'd the
present Treaty.
Done at the City of Washington, the sixth day of February, one thousand nine hundred and twenty-two.
88941-28--4
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ters of property rather than life, and that prior to the
World War loss of life was rarely involved except in case
of attempt to escape or in case of resistance. If, "(1) A
n1erchant vessel must be ordered to submit to visit and
search to determine its character before it can be seized,"
n1eans, that after an " order to submit to visit and search"
a vessel may be seized -without further action, it can
scarcely be maintained that this part of Article I is "an
established part of international la,v." Under accepted
law the order is preliminary to the visit and search. By
visit and search the grounds for seizure are determined,
and visit and search precedes seizure, and seizure without.
v·j sit and search 'vould be justified in su'c h a case only on
the ground of resistance. The Instructions for the Navy
of the United States issued in June, 1917, were similar
to those of other States, and w·ere as follows:
47. The boarding officer shall first examJne the ship's papers in
order to ascertain her nationality, ports of departure and destination, character of cargo, and other facts deemed essential. If the
papers furnish conclusive eYidence of the innocent character of
vessel, cargo·, and voyage, the vessel shall be released ; if they
furnish probable cause for capture she shall be seized and sent in
for adjudication. (192:5. Naval War College, 27.)

There is the further complication in this paragraph of
the proposed treaty that the word "seizure," when used
in the same article as" capture," would be presumed to be
used_in the technical sense as the terms are used in naval
regulations, though it is not clear that this was intended.
Further, the object of visit and search of a vessel is not
n}lerely to determine " its character," but also to determine the character of its cargo and personnel and its
destination, conduct, etc., as grounds for seizure.
'The third paragraph of Article I states:
A merchant vessel must not be attacked unless it refuse to
submit to visit and search after warning or to proceed as directed
after ~eizure.

If this paragraph intends to convey in the word "attack" the meaning of "use of force against" in case of
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attempt to escape or resistance to visit and search, the
statement would be in accord with practice. There \vould
be some doubt as to the meaning of the words "to proceed as directed after seizure." If a merchant vessel is
in control of a prize crew there might be some question
as to the interpretation of the clause. If, ho·wever, the
xnerchant vessel was under escort of a vessel of war the
liability would be recognized. It might be possible that
after seizure a merchant vessel had been directed to proceed "\vithout prize crew or escort to a named port; then
under this paragraph some maintain that the vessel ·would
be liable to attack if deviating from the prescribed course.
As the paragraph seems to read, a merchant vessel must
not be attacked unless it refuse to submit to visit and
search after vvarning or (refuse) to proceed as directed
after seizure, it may be said that this clause "or to proceed as directed after seizure " did not appear in the
draft resolutions as originally presented.
It has been claimed that the fourth paragraph greatly
extends the liabili~ty of merchant vessels to destruction
because stating that "A 1nerchant vessel must not be destroyed unless the crew and passengers have been first
placed in safety" might imply that after placing the
crew and passengers in safety, the vessel might la.\vfully
be destroyed, which is not an established part of international law, and some have questioned how this restriction applies in case of refusal to submit to visit and
search.
The second part of Article I affirmed that the above
are universal rules, and that if a submarine can not
capture a merchant vessel in conformity with these rules,
the existing la \V 9f nations requires it to desist from
attack and to pern1it the merchant vessel to proceed unmolested. Verbal questions, such as whether the use of
the word "desist·" was with intention to imply that the
attack had already begun have been put forward. In
view of the use of the word " seizure," in preceding para-
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graphs, and the use of the vYords "capture" and "seizure " in this part of Article I, there has been uncertainty
as to the significance of these words and the order of
action implied.
Article II invites the assent of civilized po·wers to
Article I as a " statement of the established lavv so that
there may be a clear public understanding throughout
the world of the standards of conduct by vvhich the pubhe opinion of the world is to pass judgment upon future
belligerents." This clearly aims to secure the sanction
of public opinion for Article I, vvhile Article III aims to
secure legal sanction for making a man who may be
under orders of his government and liable for disobedience to those orders, also liable to the civil or military
authorities of any other povver, even the enemy, "as
for an act of piracy." This is not necessarily confined to
officers of submarines.
Article IV affir1ns what has been further questioned,
•~ the. practical impossibility of using sub1narines as comn1erce destroyers without violating, as they vvere violated
in the recent vvar of 1914-1918, the requirements universally accepted by civilized nations for the protection of
the lives of neutrals and noncombatants." 'rhere are
many different points of vievv as to what are " commerce
destroyers" and in regard to other matters.
Some of these and other queries vvere raised at the Conference on Limitation of .Armament and in the course of
the subcommittee discussions, as may be seen from the
official report.
Prep(Jff'ation of treaty on subm(JJf'ines.-The treaty, as
stated in the official report, was not referred to technical
subcommittees for consideration and hence the discussion of its provisions is found in the reports of the subcommittee on limitation of armament.
The original proposition as to the rules :for submarines
was made by Mr. Root, of the American delegation, on
December 28, 1921. Mr. Root said:
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One fact which seemed very clear was that mere agreements
between Governments, rules formulated among diplomats in the
course of the ~cientific development of international law, had a
very weak effect upon belligerents when violation would see1n to
aid in the attainment of the great object of victory. This has
been clearly demonstrated in the war of 1914-18.
Another fact establi~hed by the war was that the opinion of
civilized nations had tremendous force and exercised a powerful
influence on the condition of belligerents. The history of propaganda during the war had been a history of almost universal
appeal to the public opinion of mankind and the result of the war
had come largely a$ a response.

'.rhe report further says:
The purpose of the resolutim;1s, he was about to read was to put
into such simple form the subject whiCh had so stirred the feelings of a great part of the civilized world that the man in the
street and the man on the farm could understand it.
The first resolution, 1\ir. Root said, aimed at stating the existing rules, which, of course, were known to the committee but
which the mass of people did not know, in such a form that they
would be understood by every one.
Mr. Root then read the following :
"I. The signatory powers, desiring to make more effective the
rules adopted by civilized nations for the protection of the lives
of neutrals and noncombatants at sea in time of war, declare that
among those rules the following are to be deemed an established
part of international law:
"1. A merchant vessel must be ordered to stop for visit and
search to determine its character before it can be captured.
"A merchant vessel must not be attacked unless' it refused to
stop for visit and search after warning.
"A merchant vessel must not be destroyed unless the crew and
passengers have been first placed in safety.
" 2. Belligerent sub1narines are not under any circumstances
exempt from the universal rules above stated; and if a submarine
can not capture a merchant vessel in conformity with these rules,
the existing law of nations requires it to desist from attack and
from capture and to permit the merchant vessel to proceed
unmolested."

*

*

*

*

*

*

This, Mr. Root said, was a distinct pronouncement ,on the
German contention during the war in regard to the conflict
between the convenience of destruction and the action of the
belligerent under the rules of international law.
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Mr. Root then read the following :
"II. The signatory powers recognize the practical impossibility
of using submarines as commerce destroyers without violating the
requirements universally accepted by civilized nations for the
protection of the lives of neutrals and noncombatants, and to the
end that the prohibition of such use shall be· universally accepted
as a part of the law of nations, they declare their assent to such
prohibition and invite all other nations to adhere thereto." (Conference on the Limitation of Armament, 3 p. 594.)

Discussion of treaty.-When taken up for discussion on
December 29, 1921, Mr. Balfour (British) and Admiral
de Bon (French) adhered in principle to the propositions
of Mr. Root.
Senator Schanzer said that he associated himself entirely with
Mr. Balfour's and Ad1niral de Bon's remarks. The Italian delegation at the preceding meeting gave its full adherence to the aim
to which Mr. Root's proposal tended, but they also thought that
the question of formulating niles for the use of submarines in
war was, above all, a legal question, whi~h ought to be examined
by a competent committe-e of jurists. (Ibid. p. 606.)

Replying to certain questions of Senator Schanzer, Mr.
Root said:
First, as to the agreement of Resolution I of the resolutions now
before the committee, with the second resolution relative to the
prohibition of making use of submarines as commerce destroyers,
which Senator Schanzer deemed inconsistent with Resolution I.
Resolution I was a statement of existing law; Resolution II, if
adopted, would constitute a change) from the existing law and
therefore it was impossible to say that it was not inconsistent.
If it were not inconsistent, there would be no change. Resolution II could not be consistent with Resolution I and still make
a change.

The report continues:
Senator Schanze·r had also suggested that the Resolution I be
completed by including a definition of "a merchant ship."
Throughout all the long history of international law no term bad
been better understood than the term "a merchant ship."
It could not be ·made clearer by addition of definitions which
would only serve to we·aken and confuse it. The merchant ship,
3 These references are to the fun report printed in English and French.
Government Printing Office, 1922.

I
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its treatment, its rights, its protection, and its immunities, were
at the base of the law of nations. Nothing was more clearly or
better understood than the subject called "merchant ship." (Ibid.
p. 610.)

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

Mr. Root declared he was opposed to the reference of this resolution to a committee of lawyers or to any other emnmittee. He
asked for a vote upon it bere. If the delegation of any country
represented here had any error to point out in it, he was ready
to correct it, but he asked for a vote upon it in furtherance· of the
principle to which every one of his colleagues around the table
had given his adherence.
Mr. Root said that, in answering Senator Schanzer's very discriminating question regarding the relations between Resolutions
I and II, he had omitted to say that, of course, if the second
resolution were adopted by all the' world, it would supersede
Resolution I. This, however, would be a long, slow process and
during the inte·rval the law as it stood must apply until an agreement was reached. Resolution I also explained in authorized
forin the existing law and could be brought for·ward when the
public asked what changes were proposed. In proposing a change,
he said, it was: necessary to m3;ke clear what the existing law
was. It was very important to link this: authoritative statement
in Resolution I with the new principle proposed in Resolution II.
(Ibid. p. 618.)

Mr. Balfour, on the afternoon of Dece:r_nber 29, 1921,
said of the British Empire delegationthe members of that delegation ·would have preferred that the
document itself shou:d have been rendered unnecessary by the
aboliUon of submarines. Since they had not been able, to carry
out this policy, however, Mr. Root's resolution provided them with
an alternative. (Ibid. p. 630.)

Mr. Hughes, on the same day, said:
Such a declaration as the one proposed in the first resolution
would go to the whole world as an indication that, while the committee could not agree on such limitation, there was no disagreement on the question that submarines should never be used contrary to the principles of law governing war. (Ibid. p. 636.)

Drafting commdttee.-The first resolution, later .Article
I of the submarine treaty, was referred to a drafting committee of one member from each delegation, Mr. Root
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being named from the American delegation; Sir Auckland Geddes, from the British; Admiral de Bon and Mr.
Kammerer, from the French ; Signor Ricci, from the
Italian; Mr. Hanihara, from the Japanese. The other
provisions were also referred to the same committee.
Mr. Hughes, speaking of the second resolution, which
later became Article IV of the treaty, said:
This resolution fundamentally recognized, however, the practical
impossibility of using submarines. as commerce destroyers without
violating the requirements. universally accepted by civilized nations for the protection of neutrals: and noncombatants.. He assumed the resolution to mean that, while the rules of war were as
stated in the first resolution-at least in substance-and while it
was the sense of the powers there represented that they should
be adhered to and clearly understood, the civilized world would
be asked to outlaw the submarine· as a weapon against commerce.
(Ibid. p. 638 )

Resolution /.-Resolution I was presented by the draft.
ing committee on January 5, 1922, as follows:
I. The signatory powers, desiring to make more effective the
rules adopted by civilized nations for the protection of the lives
of neutrals and noncombatants at sea in time of war, declare that
among those rules the following are to be dee·med an established
part of international law:
(1) A merchant ve·ssel must be ordered to submit to visit and
search to determine its character before it can be seized.
A merchant vessel must not be attacked unless it refuse to sub~
mit to visit and search after warning or to proce..ed as directed
after seizure.
A merchant vessel must not be destroyed unless the crew and
passengers have been first placed in safety.
(2) Belligerent submarines are not under any circumstances exempt from the universal rules above stated; and if a submarine
can not capture a merchant vessel in conformity with these rules,
the existing law of nations requires it to desist from attack and
from seizure and to permit the merchant vessel to proceed unmolested. (Ibid. p. 686.)

"Merchant ves-sel" and1" capt'ure. "-Senator Schanzer
requested the following entries in the minutes of the
subcommittee :

MERCHANT VESSEL
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It is declared that the meaning of Article II is as follows:
Submarines have the same obligation and the same rights as sur•
face craft.
And:
With regard to the· third paragraph of Articie I it is understood
that a distinction is1 made between the deliberate destruction of
a merchant vessel and the destruction which may result from
a lawful attack in accordance with the rules of the seGond paragraph. If a war vessel under the circumstances described in
paragraph 2 of Article I lawfully attacks a merchant vess~l, it
can not l1e held that a war vessel, before attacking, should put
tbe crew and passengers of the merchant vessel in safety. (Ibid.
p. 686.)

_ I.ater the report says:
B nator Schanzer stated that the Italian delegation accepted
Resulution I, but that, so far as they were concerned, the application of the resolution was subject to the two statements made
by him in the subcommittee as entered on the minutes of the
first meeting (December 31, 192:1) of the subcommittee of five
011 drafting and as just read by Mr. Root.
Senator Schanzer stated in addition that the Italian delegation understood the term "merchant vessel" in the resolution to
refer to unarmed merchant vessels.
Mr. Hanihara said that he wished to suggest that the word
"seize" should be substituted for "capture" in the last paragraph.
Mr. Root, replying to Mr. Hanihara, said that the subcommittee
understood the word " capture " to describe the whole process,
one step of which was seizure and that it was intended to make
the term "capture" comprehensive. (Ibid., p. 688.)
Senator Schanzer said he did not deny that under existing rules
of international law a merchant vessel might properly carry a
limited armament for defensive purposes, but he wished to say
that the Italian interpretation of the tern1 "merchant vessel"
took into account this· limitation. IIe therefore repeated that
the Italian interpretation was in accord with his preceding declaration and with the existing rules of international law. (Ibid. p.
69 2.)
1

Mr. Hughes said:
He assumed that. all the representatives present accepted the
proposition that merchant vessels, as merchant vessels-a category
well known-stood where they were under the law, and that this
resolution defined the duties of submarines with respect to them.
(Ibid. p. 692. )

50

SUBMARINES

Mr. Root later hin1self explained Article I:
It will be observed that the statement . in this treaty of the
rules relating to visit and search and seizure does not undertake
to state all the rules of international law upon that subject. It
was not intended to state all such rules. It was not intended to
be a codification of international law relating to visit and search
and seizure. The purpose was to state only the most important
rules for the protection of innocent life so briefly and simply that
every intelligent person could understand them, and to refrain
from.. confusing the unscientific mind by the introduction of the
less important details. This was · required by the main consideration upon which the treaty relies for its effectiveness. The
treaty is not n1erely a declaration of existing l3:w. It is not
merely an agreement between governmentS' resulting from diplon1atic negotiation. It is all these, but above all, it is an appeal
to the public opinion of mankind to establish and maintain a
fundamental rule of morals applied to international conduct in
the form of a rule of international law. (Men and Policies, p.
462. Address American Society of International Law, April 27,
1922.)

Resolution I /.-Resolution II later became Resolution
III and finally Article IV of the submarine treaty. As
presented on the afternoon of January 5, 1922, it was as
follo,vs:
" The signatory po,vers recognize the practical impossibility of
using submarines as commerce destroye~rs '\Vithout violating the
require·m ents universally accepted by civilized nations for the
protection of the, lives of neutrals and noncombatants and to the
end that the prohibition of such use shall be universally accepted
as a part of the law of nations they declare· their assent to such
prohibition and invite all other nations to adhere thereto." (Conf erence on the Limitation of Armament, p. 694.)
Mr . Sarraut then read the· f.o llowing statement:
"The Germans have· made war on com1nerce almost exclusively ·
with their submarines, which were instructed · to sink without
mercy the merchant vessels of _the· enemy with the object of de·
st1·oying that ene~my's commerce. The abominable program was
made worse by sinking, without distinction, steamers and hospital
ships as well as vessels carrying cargo-neutrals as well as those
of the enemy. These ships were destroyed without the passenge·r s
and crew having been first put in a place of safety. France· has
already proclaimed and she has reiterated her denunciation of the
barbarous methods thu..q used contrary to the law of humanity and
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she has condemned the': pitiless destruction of merchant ships as
contrary to international law. With these views, the· French delegation fully indorses the spirit of Senator Root's resolution and of
the a1nendment proposed by Mr. Balfour. But the delegation con::;lders it desirable that the· sentiment of condemnation of the methods employed in the last war should be expressed in the resolution,
and for this purpose it suggests the addition of the words 'in the
· manner that was employed in the last war' at the· end of the
phrase.
''The first phrase of the resolution would then read as follows:
" 'The signatory powers recognize the practical impossibility of
using supmarines. as, commerce destroyers without violating the
requirements universally accepted by civilized nations for the protection of the lives of neutrals and noncombatants in the manner
that was e·mployed in the last war.'"
The chairman said that Mr. Sarraut had called attention to the
amendment which had been proposed by Mr. Balfour. The resolution, as it had been read a moment before, had not included that
an1endment and therefore it should be restated ; he would, therefore, read Resolution III with the a1nendment proposed by Mr.
Balfour:
"The signatory powers recognize the practical impossibility ot
using submarines as commerce destroy~rs without violating the
requirements universally accepted by civilized nations for the· protection of the lives of neutrals and noncombatants, and to the end
that the prohibition of such use· shall be universally accepted as a
part of the law of nations they now accept that prohibition as
henceforth binding as between themselves, and they invite all
other nations to adhere thereto."
That was the resolution before the committee with the amel).dment suggested by Mr. Balfour. Mr. Sarraut had suggested that
it should alsp. embrace a reference to the methods adopted by the
Imperial German Government in the last war, which had received
general condemnation. As. he understood it, the resolution, with
the amendment of Mr. Balfour and the further amend1nent pro·
posed by Mr. Sarraut, would read as follows:
"The signatory powers recognize the practical impossibility of
using submarines as commerce destroyers without violating the
requirements universally accepted by civilized nations for the
protection of the lives of neutrals and noncombatants. in the man·
ner that was employed in the last war, and to the end that the
prohibition of such us:e shall be universally accepted as a part of
the law of nations, they now accept that prohibition as henceforth
binding as between themselves and they invite all other nations
to adhere thereto."
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The question before the committee 'vas the· adoption of this
resolution. Before the discussion proceeded, he wished to ask Mr.
Sarraut whether the words which Mr. Sarraut desired inserted, to
wit, "in the manner that was employed in the last war," were
to be inserted at the place which had been indicated.
Mr. Root said that Admiral de Bon and he had worked out a
phrase on the exact line of Mr. San·aut's and he wondered whether
it would not meet the purpose. After the word "violating" the ·
words "as they were violated in the recent war of 1914-1918,"
should be inserted, so that the resolution would read:
" The signatory powers recognize the practical impossibility of
using submarines as commerce destroyers without violating, as
they were violated in the recent war of 1914-1918, the requirenlents universally accepted by civilized natiqns," etc.
The chairman asked 'vhether this wording was agreeable to Mr.
Sarraut.
Mr. Sarraut assented.
The chairman said he would read the complete resolution, so
that there would be no question upon what action was being
taken:
"The signatory po,vers recognize the practical impossibility of
using submarines as commerce destroyers without violating, as
they were violated in the recent 'var of 1914-1H18, the requirements universally accepted by civilized nations for the protection
of the lives of neutrals and noncombatants, and to the end that
the prohibition of such use shall be' universally accepted as a part
of the law of nations they now accept that prohibition as henceforth binding as between themselves, and they invite all other
nations to adhere thereto."
Mr. Balfour ~aid he wished to ask a question in regard to the
amendment, now slightly modified, which Mr. Sarraut had proposed and which read as follows :
"The signatory powe·rs recognize the practical impossibility of
using submarines as comme·rce· destroyers 'vithout violating, as
they were violated in the re·cent war of 19·14-1918, the requirements universally accepted by civilized nations," etc.
If that w~re intended merely as .an illustration it might be wise
or unwise; it n1ight be necessary or unnecessary; at any rate,
used in this manner, it could do no hann. It added fonn and
perhaps picturesqueness to the whole resolution. He wished to
ask, however, whether:· it was not possible so to twist the· phrase
that the article would apply only to German methods. The ingenuity of man for wrongdoing was very great. Was it not
unfortunate that the wrongdoers should be hampered only by
the methods adopted by the Germans? 'Vould it not be possible
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rur them to say, "It is true we have used our subn1arines as commerce destroyers, but -vve· have not used them as the· Gennans
did, and consequently we are not violating this resolution."
Perhaps the question he asked was oversubtle, but it appeared to
be worthy of conside·ra tion.
l\ir. Root asked whether that question would not be olJviated
uy silnply repeating the· words "The, use· of sub1narines as commerce destroyers" in the place of "'o.f such use·."
Mr. Balfour replied in the affirmative.
The chairn1an asked whether that a1nenclment was acceptable.
Adn1iral de Bon said that his reasons, as already stated by Mr.
Sarraut, \Vere· based upon the fear that the Germans might use
the first draft suggested as a pretext to justify some of their
actions during the recent war. They 1night claim that, if the
'Vashington Conference took the ground that it was not possible
to use submarines otherwise than in contravention of actual international law, they were in a 1neasure absolved. This was the only
idea that he had sought to convey. In his opinion the·re ought to
be a full and complete condemnation of these methods. It was for
this reason that the French delegation had desired specifically to
object to German practices and thus to remove all possibility of
tbeir being able to use the· resolution in que·stion to justify their
conduct.
The chainnan asked whether the amend1nent as suggested was
acceptable. The amendment was that the· clause: "To the end
tbat the· prohibition of such use shall be universally accepted as a
part of the· law of nations" should read "to the end that the
prohibition of the use~ of submarines as com1nerce destroyers shall
be universally accepted as a part of the law of nations."
The chairman said that the reason he· asked whether this wa::,
acceptable was that it was an amendment to meet the amendment
.suggested by Mr. Sarraut, and therefore really formed part of
the amendment in the line suggested, and he thought it would be
well to know whether there was any objection to the· amplification of Mr. Sarraut's amendment in that manner.
Mr. Sarraut replied that he had no objection.
The chairman said that in view of what had just been saicl by
Admiral de Bon, it might be· well to call attention to the fact that
this resolution was not, and did not purport to be·, a state1nent
of existing law ; it purported to go beyond existing law and to prohibit the use of submarines as com1nerce destroyers. (Ibid. pp.
6.94-700.)
The signatory powers recognize the practical impossibility of
using submarines as commerce destroyers without violating, as
·:_ they were violated in the recent war of 19,14-1918, the reqnire-
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ments universally accepted by civilized nations for the protection
of the lives of neutrals and noncombatants:, and to the end that
the prohibition of the· use of submarines as commerce destroyer~
shall be universally accepted as a part of the law of nations they
now accept that prohibition as henceforth binding as b~tween
themselves, and they i·nvite· all other nations~ to adhere thereto.
(Ibid. p. 710.)
"Oon~merce

des1troye1\"-Lord Lee asked 'vhat vvas the
precise meaning of the tern1 "commerce destroyer."
He did not know if "comn1erce destroyer " was a recognized
legal ter1n or whether it included the processes of attack and
seizure referred to in the first resolution.
Mr. Root said he· believed it covered the 'vhole process. He
thought that "c01nmerce· destroyer" was a perfectly well-known
term.
Lord Lee said that doubts. were being expressed in his delegation
as to the precite meaning of the· phrase "commerce destroyer."
He asked whether the term "for seizures or attacks on c01nmerce"
would not produce the same effect.
Mr. Hoot said he thought that if the cmnmittee undertook to go
into the details of the proces~es, it would find itself involved in
statements. which 'vere neither clear nor intelligible to the common
mind, and that it really did not accomplish its purpose as well as
would be done by the use of perfectly well-known tenns, such as
" cmnmerce destroyers." (Ibid. p. 700.)

*

*

*

*

*

*

:Mr. Hanihara said he desired to be inforn1ed with respect to
the exact meaning of the term " commerce destroyer." As he· had
already pointed out in a previous discussion, he believed that the
words 'vere intended to apply to vessels suitable for destruction
of merchant shipping. * * *
l\lr. Root said he thought that the prohibition would apply to
submarines attacking or seizing or capturing or destroying merchant vessels under any circumstances, so long as the vessel ren1ained a merchant vessel; he also thought it was necessary to
have an effective prohibition to have it so apply. (Ibid., p. 703.)

Article, IV.-On January 6, 1922, Mr. Root, discussing
"rhat later became Articles I and IV, said o£ Article IV:
The next resolution, which forbade the use of submarines as
com1nerce destroyers, that was. to say, forbade submarines attacking merchant ships, and ·which if it were to become a part· of the
law of nations would supersede these other rules so far as sub~
marine-s were concerned-but which would not supersede them
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until it had become a part of the law of nations-was an entirely
different proposition. It certainly was not competent for them
to make an agreement between the, five powers here that would
produce the effect of a law of nations upon which they could denounce a punishment as for piracy. (Ibid., p. 722.)

Presentation. to conference.-On February 1, 1922, at
the plenary session at the Conference on the Limitation
of Armament, Mr. Root presented the treaty on submarines with the follo\ving explanation:
You will observe that this. treaty does not undertake to codify
international law in respect of visit, search, or seizure of 1nerchant
vessels. 'Vhat it does undertake t01 do is to state the most important
and effective provision& of the law of nations in regard to the
treahnent of 1nerchant_ vessels by belligerent warships, and to
declare that subn1arines a:re under no circu1nstances exempt from
these humane rules for the protection of the life of innocent
noncon1ba tan ts.
It undertakes further to ~tigmatize violation of these rules, and
the doing to death of women and children and noncombatants
by the ·wanton destruction of merchant vesse:s upon which they
are passengers, a~: by a violation of the laws of war which, as between these five great powers and all other civilized nations who
shall giye their adherence thereto, shall be henceforth punished
as an act of piracy.
It undertakes further to preyent temptation to the violation of
these rules by the use of tubmarines for the capture of 1nerchant
vessels and to prohibit that u~e altogether. It undertakes further to denounce the use of poisonous gas8s and chemicals in
war as they were u ~ed to the horror of all civilization in the war
of 1914--1918. (Ibid. p. 268.)
Adn~iral

Knapp's co1nrnent.-A resolution for the appointment of a commission of jurists to consider whether
existing rules cover ne·w methods of \Varfare was adopted
at the Conference on the Limitation of Armament, but a
later resolution removed from their competence the consideration of submarines and gas ·warfare. Of this resolution Admiral Harry S. l(napp, United States Navy,
'v-riting shortly before his death, said:
But the most extraordinary limitation on the powers of the
commission is to be found in resolution No. 2 of the1 Washington
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Conference. This was adopted by the same signatory powers that
a dopted resolution No. 1 and at the same session. It reads:
" R e.solved, That it is not the intention of the powers agreeing
t o th e appointment of a commission to consider and report upon
the r ules of international law respecting new agencies of warfare
that the ·commission shall review or report upon the rules or
declarations relating t o submarines or the use of noxious ga ses
and chem.icals already a dopted by the powers in this conference."
Resolution No. 2 can only mean that the delega tes of the signatory powers were so entirely satisfied with the work of the conference regarding submarine and gas warfar e as to rega r d it as
the last word in form and substance ; oth erwise th ey would not
have removed the r ight to re·v iew or report upon t he rules a nd
declarations of that treaty from the commission t hey themselves
had just created to study the broad qvestion, of which submarine
and gas warfare are such integral and outst anding parts.
Such satisfaction is not universally sh ared. The need for
revision of the la\VS of war is manifest; and it is regrettable that
a com1nission of dist inguished j u rists should have been called
together for t hat purpose with such a limit ation u pon their action
as that ilnposed by resolution No. 2. 4-s for t reaty No. 2, a n rittE:mpt is made in what follows t o show that it needs revision,
eE;pecially in respect of its provisions regarding submarine wa rfare~a revision t hat T he H agu e commission would have been so
competent to make.
The present criticism of t he treaty is not born of any lack of
sympa thy with its purpose on the pa rt of the writer. On the cont r ary, h e has exerted such influence as---he had toward the adop~
t ion of a more r a dical solution of the subma rine problem than
t h e t reaty attempts. H e would prefer to see tbe sub1narine abolished. That view has n ot prevailed, ho\vever, and worse still, the
vVashington Conference failed to put any limitation upon the numbers of submarines, relative or absolute. It consequently failed,
potentially at least, to stop competition in submarine building.
Under existing circumstances, and having in mind the submarine
p ractices of the Germans during the war-practices that were
such a blot upon the German national repu::ation-it was all-important that any agreement on the subject reached by the vVash·
ington Conference should be correct in substance and form ; and
this is especially true if that agreement was to be the· final word on
the subject. It was the last word in so far as The Hague commission is concerned; but it can not be doubted that a future
conference on the laws. of maritime warfare, compos-ed of delegates from all maritime powers so that the voice of the conference will carry real international authority, will refuse to be
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:Shackled by such a limitation as that prescribed by resolution No.
2 of the 'Vashington Conference. (39' Am. Pol. Sci. Rev., J une,
1924, p. 203.)

Report of A n1erican delegation.-In the report of the
_American delegation to the President on February 9,
1922, there are reprinted certain parts of the report of the
advisory committee of t\Yenty-one, and of this report on
submarines the delegation says "this report was presented
by the American delegation as setting forth in a succinct
manner the position of their Government." In this report it \vas stated :
The submarine as a n1an-of-war has a very vital part to play.
It has emne to stay. It 1nay strike without warning against combatant vessels, as snrfaee ships may do also, but it must bei re-quired to observe the prescribed rules of surface craft when
opposing merchantmen as at other times. (Conference on the
Lin1itation of Armament. Sen. Doc. No. 126, 67th Con~., 2d sess.,
p, 814.)

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

The committee is therefore of the opinion that unlimited warfare
·by submarines on commerce should be outlawed. The right of
visit and search must be exercised by submarines under the same
:rules as for surface vessels. (Ib~cl. p. 815.)

Immediately following this report is the treaty upon
:Submarines, and as introductory thereto is the following
})aragraph :
vVhile the conferenee \Yas unable either to abolish or to lhnit
subinarines, it stated, with e~arity and force, tbe existing rules
of international law which conde1nned the abhorrent practices
followed in the recent war in the use of submarines against n1erehan t vessels. (Ibid. p. 815.)

The report also repeats ~Ir. Root's. statement to the
conference \vhen, speaking of the submarine treaty and
the rules of maritime war, he said:
It undertakes further to prevent ten1ptation to the violation of
these rules by the use of submarines for the capture of Iner·Chant vessels, and fo prohibit that use altogether. (Ibid. ·p . 816.)

Summary.-Article I of the treaty, aiming as the whole
treaty does, to protect the lives of neutrals and noncom88041-28--5
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batants, considers in successive paragraphs visit and
search before seizure, attack after refusing visit and
search, or to pro ~ eed as directed after seizure, destruction
without placing personnel in safety, and the application
of these so-called universal rules, and addsand if a subn1arine can not capture a merchant vessel in conformity with these rules the ex~sting 1a\v of nations requires
it to desist from attack and frcm seizure and to permit the· merchant vessel to proeeed unmolested. (Conference on Limitation of
Armament, p. 836.)

By this last clause the submarine is required under
certain conditions, to desist " from attack and from
seizure." l\1anifestly it is not the ~ purpose to deny the
right of visit and search, but, as Mr. Root says, "to dec:are that submarines are, under no circumstances, exempt
from those hun1ane rules for the protection of the life
of innocent noncombatants," and Article I itself simply
declares "that among the rules adopted by civilized nations " "the follo\Ying are to be deemed an established part
of international lavv." The discussion in the conference
indicates this understanding.
The conclusion is that Article I does not change existiEg la \V but, as said in Article II, aims to establish " a
clear public understanding throughout the \VOr ld of the
standards of conduct by ·which the public opinion of the
V\Torld is to pass judgment upon future belligerents."
Further in Article III penalty " as if for an act of
piracy " is provided for " attacks upon and the seizure
and destruction of merchant ships " in violation of these
rules.
In the original proposal Mr. Root stated the first resolution as follo,vs: "A merchant vessel must be ordered to
stop for visit and search to determine its character before
it can be captured." I...Jater, in reply to Mr. Hanihara,
\V ho suggested " seize " instead of " capture " in a later
paragraph of the same article, Mr. Root said "that the
subcommittee understood the \Vord 'capture' to describe
the whole process, one step of \Vhich V\'as seizure, and it
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'vas intended to make the term' capture' co1nprehensive."
(Ibid. p. 688.)
It was not understood that this t~rm included visit and
search, as by the article itself visit, and search must precede capture or seizure, and was to determine the character of the merchant vessel and its liability to seizure or
capture.
Early opinions-.-Visit and search as necessarily pre ..
ceding seizure or capture has long been recognized. Sir
\Villiam Scott in the case of the Maria in 1799 declared
he takes it to be incontrovertibleThat the right of visiting and searching merchant ships upon the
high seas, whatever be the· ships:, whateYer be thP cargoe·s, whatever be the destinations:, is an incontestablP right of the lawfully
commissioned cruisers of a belligerent nation. I say, be the ships,
the cargoes, and the destinations what they may, because, till they
are visited and searched, it does not appear what the ships, the
cnrgoes, or the destinations are; and it is for the purposp of ascertaining these points that the necessity of this right of visit and
search exists. This right is so clear .in principle, that no man
can deny· it who admits: the legality of maritilne capture; because
if you are not at liberty to ascertain by sufficient inquiry whether
there is property that can be legally captured, it is: impossibJe to
capture.
. In short, no man in the least degree conversant in subjects of this kind has ever, that I kno\v of, breathed
a doubt upon it. (1 C. Robinson, p. 340.)

Similarly in the case of the 11!arria.n na Flora Mr. Justice
Story said of visit and search :
This right is strictly a belligerent right, allowed by thP general
consent of nations: in time of war, and limited to those occasions.
( 11 "\Yhea ton, 1 )

:No treaty 'vonld renounce such a generally recognized
1·ight as visit and search, 'vhich is the subject of so many
treaty agreements, 'vithout. express stipulation. From a
practical standpoint the exercise of visit and search when
camouflage or other concealment of identity are possible
and much resorted to is essential to the conduct of 'var
on the seas. This seems to be admitted in the first clause
of the provisions of Article I which states "a merchant
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vessel must be ordered to submit to visit and search to
determine its character before it can be seized." Further,
it may be said that visit and search does not necessarily
imperil " the lives of neutrals and noncombatants " \Yhich
ii is the aim of the submarine. treaty to protect.
Gern~an practice, 1914-1918.-Gerinany on February 4,
1915, proclaimed the ·waters about Great Britain and Ireland a \Yar zone in \vhich every enemy merchant ship
\Yould, after February 18, "be destroyed without it being
always possible to avert the dangers threatening the crews
and passengers on that account." Neutral vessels \Vere
\Yarned that they were exposed to ~anger in the war zone,
because neutral flags had been used by belligerent merchantmen and because of possible accidents.
In \Yhat has been called the "strict accountability" note
of Mr. Brya:q_ of February 10, 1915, it was said:
It is, of course, not necessary to remind the German GoYernment
that the sole right of a belligerent in dealing with neutral vessels
on the high seas is limited to visit and search, unless a blockade j'l
proclaimed and effectiYely maintained, which this Government doe~
not understand to be proposed in this case. To declare or exercise
the right to attack and destroy any vessel entering a prescribed
area of the high seas without first certainly detern1ining its belligerent nationality and the contraband character of its cargo would
be an act so unprecedented in naval warfare that this Government
is reluctant to believe that the Imperial Government of Germany
in this case contemplates it as possible. The suspicion that enemy
ships are using neutral flags improperly can create no just pre·
sun1ption that all ships traversing a pre~ri~ed area are subject to
the same suspicion. It is to determine exactly such questions that
this Government understands the right of visit and. search to haye
been recognized. (Spec. Sup. An1er. Jour. Int. Law, July, 1915,
p. 86.)

Germany had previously attempted to justify, on the
ground of retaliation, its action, \vhich \Vas ad1nittedly
beyond the lavv, saying:
Great Britain invokes vital interests of the British Empire
which are at stake in justification of its violations of the law
of nations, and the neutral powers appear to be satisfied with
theoretical protests, thus actually adn1itting the vital interests of
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a belligerent as sufficient excuse for methods of waging war of
whateveJ; description.
The tilne has con1e for Gennany also to invoke such vital
interests. It therefore finds itself under the necessity, to its
regret, of taking military measures against England in retaliation
of the practice followed by England. (Ibid. p. 85.)

In the German note of February 16, ~915, it was said:
:Nloreover, tl!e British Govern1nent have armed English mer~
chant vessels and instructed them to resist by force the Ger1nan
subn1arines. In these circu1nstances it is very difficult for the
German submarines to recognize neutral merchant vessels as such,
for even a search will not be possib~e in the majority of cases,
since the attacks to be anticipated in the case of a disguised
English ship would expose the comn1anders conducting a search
aud the boat itself to the danger of d~struction.
The British Government would then be in a position to render
Gennan measures illusory if their merchant marine persists in the
misuse of neutral flags and neutral vessels are not marked in
some other manner admitting of no possible doubt. (Ibid. p. 94.)

Sir Ed,varcl Grey, in a note of February 19, 1915,
stated:
The obligation upon a belligerent warship to ascertain definitely
for itself the nationality and character of a merchant vessel before
capturing it and a fortiori before sinking and destroying it has
been universally recognized. (Ibid. p. 97.)

Anterican discussion.-On February 20, 1915, the
l Tnited States, anxious to establish a modus vivevndi bet,veen the belligerents, proposed "That neither ·will use
submarines to attack merchant vessels of any nationality
except to enforce the right of visit-and search." Many
notes bet,veen the belligerents and the United States 'vere
exchanged, and Mr. Bryan, replying on Nlarch 30, 1915,
to certain British notes, said:
The order in council of the 15th of March would constitute, ·were
its provisions to be actually carried into effect as they stand, a
practical assertion of unlimited belligerent rights over neutral
commerce within the whole European area and an almost unquali
fied denial of the, sovereign rights of the nations now at peace.
This Government takes it for granted that there can be no
question what those rights are. A nation's sovereignty over its
4
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own ships and citizens under its own flag on the high seas in time
of peace is, of course, unlimited; and that sovereignty suffers no
diminution in time of war, except in so far as the practice and
consent of civilized nations has limited it by the recognition of
certain now clearly determined rights, which it is conceded n1ay
be exercised by nations which are at war.
A belligerent nation has been conceded the right of visit and
search, and the right of capture and condemnation, if upon examination a neutral vessel is found to be engaged in unneutral service
or to be carrying contraband of "'\Var intended for the enemy's
government or armed forces. (Ibid. p. 117.)

In the note of April 21, 1915, to the German ambassador, the Secretary of State said of the Government of the
United States:
It has, indeed, insisted upon the use of visit and search as an
absolutely necessary safeguard against mistaking neutral vessels
for vessels owned by an enemy· and against mistaking legal cargoes
for illegal. (Ibid. p. 128.)

On June 9, 1915, in a note to Germany, the United
States said:
Nothing but actual forcible resistance or continued efforts to
escape by flight when ordered to stop for the purpose of visit on
the part of the 1nerchanhnan has ever been held to forfeit the
lives of her passengers or crew. (Ibid. p. 139.)

The United States has therefore insisted upon the necessity of visit and search before seizure in order to safeguard neutral rights and has denied the right to attack
merchant vessels except on the ground of resistance or
atten1pts to escape.
Re ,view~ of proposed treaty.-Article IV of the submarine treaty is a "prohibition of the use of sub1narines as
c• )mmerce destroyers."
In reply to Lord Lee's query as to ·whether " commerce
destroyer" was a recognized legal term, or whether it included the process of attack and seizure referred to in the
first resolution, ":1\fr. Root said he believed it covered the
'vhole process. He thought 'commerce destroyer' was a
perfectly well-kno,vn term." (Conference on I...Jimita tion
of Ar1nament, p. 700.)
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After discussion in the committee on limitation ot
armament on January 5, 1922, the "\Vords " commerce destroyer" were retained instead of substituting the words
"submarines for operations against merchant vessels."
During this discussion Senator Schanzer said:
Submarines were military weapons and should be allowed the
privileges of military weapons. They Inight even act in the same
way as surface vessels. (Ibid. p. 708.)

The expression " The signatory po-wers recognized the
practical impossibility of using submarines as commerce
destroyers without violating, as they w·ere violated in
the recent war of 1914-1918, the requirements universally
accepted by civilized nations for the protection of the
lives of neutrals and noncombatants" \Vas deliberately
adopted \vith the understanding that the \vords "comnlerce destroyers " " was a perfectly "\Vell-kno,vn term.-"
'I his well-kno"\vn term " commerce destroyers " in the
common dictionary sense means a vessel " intended to
prey on, capture, and destroy the 1nerchant shipping of
an enemy, generally one of high speed and light armament." As this article \Vas adopted at the conference
"\vhere limitation of naval armament "\Vas a prime object,
It may be presumed that this n1ean!ng of the "\Vord was
intended, particularly as the phrase in the article is
"using submarines as commerce destroyers"; i. e., as
light, fast vessels might be used to prey on commerce, or
as in 1914-1918 submarines "\Yere used putting in peril the
lives of neutrals and noncombatants.
According to the final report of the American delegation, quoting from the report of the advisory committee
of t"\venty-one, the opinion of the American Government
was that submarines would continue to be used against
combatant ships and as scouts, and that "unlin1ited 'varfare by submari~es on commerce should be outlawed.
The right of visit and search must be exercised by submarines under the sa1ne rules as for surface vessels."
(Sen. Doc. 126, 67th Cong., 2d sess., p. 815.) The report
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o:f the American advisory co1n1nittee of tw·enty-one also
stated: "If the submarine' is required to operate under
the same rule as combatant surface vessels no objection
can be raised as to its use against merchant vessels."
(Ibid. p. 813.) " This report was presented by the
American delegation as setting forth in a succinct 1nanner
the position of their Government." (Ibid. p. 813.)
Article VI of the proposed treaty in relation to the use
of submarines and noxious gases in \Varfare provided
that it should take effect on the deposit of ratifications at
Washington by all the signatory powe:r:,s. Up to the. present date, December 31, 1926, these ratifications have not
been deposited; therefore the rules governing lawful submarine warfare remain unchanged.
CONCLUSION

A belligerent submarine la \vfully commissioned as· a
vessel of war may exercise the rights of a vessel of -vvarbut its nature gives it no special rights or privileges.

